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DEFERENCE TO THE EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED
STATES AFTER SEPTEMBER 11: CONGRESS, THE
COURTS, AND THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL
ERIC A. POSNER
According to the "deference thesis," legislatures, courts, and
other government institutions should defer to the executive's
policy decisions during national security emergencies. In this
Essay, I will address two criticisms of the deference thesis. The
first argument, which has been developed most powerfully by
Professor Stephen Holmes, is that rules dominate standards at
moments of crisis.2 An executive that is unconstrained, that is,
not bound by rules, will make worse policy choices than an ex-
ecutive that is bound by rules.3 This type of argument is usu-
ally made in the context of urging legislatures and courts to
constrain the executive during emergencies.4 Some commenta-
tors, however, doubt whether it is possible for legislatures and
courts to constrain the executive during emergencies.5 These
doubts have led to a second argument that the executive
should be bound by institutions within the executive branch
such as (in the United States) the Office of Legal Counsel,6 or
* Kirkland & Ellis Professor, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Curt
Bradley, Jack Goldsmith, Aziz Huq, Trevor Morrison, and Adrian Vermeule for
very helpful comments; to Ellie Norton for research assistance; and to the Micro-
soft Fund and the Russell Baker Scholars Fund at the University of Chicago Law
School for financial assistance.
1. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY,
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 15-16 (2007) [hereinafter POSNER & VERMEULE, TERROR
IN THE BALANCE].
2. Stephen Holmes, In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the War on
Terror, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 301 (2009).
3. Id. at 305, 354.
4. This is a more general argument. For present purposes, however, I will con-
sider it only in the context of external constraints.
5. See Holmes, supra note 2, at 347-48; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Why the
President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97
YALE L.J. 1255 (1988).
6. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 32-34, 208 (2007).
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through the construction of new institutions that review the
executive branch's actions.7 Both arguments criticize the defer-
ence thesis but propose different solutions. The first argument
proposes that Congress and the judiciary give the executive
less deference; the second proposes that officials within the ex-
ecutive branch give the President less deference. Thus, we can
distinguish external constraints on the executive and internal
constraints on the President.
Both arguments are flawed. The external constraints argu-
ment gets the normal analysis backwards: rules are better for
routine, recurring situations. Although some emergencies are,
in fact, routine, the type of emergency that calls for deference is
not. The internal constraints argument, as normally presented,
makes the fatal assumption that the President can be bound by
his own agents against his own perceived interest, and relies on
other questionable premises about the structure of government
in the United States.
I. THE DEFERENCE THESIS
The deference thesis states that during emergencies the legis-
lature and judiciary should defer to the executive.' It assumes
that the executive is controlled by the President, but to the ex-
tent that the President could be bound by agents within the ex-
ecutive, the deference thesis also holds that those agents should
follow the President's orders, not the other way around. In
normal times, the three branches of government share power.
For example, if the executive believes that a new, dangerous
drug has become available, but possession of the drug is not
yet illegal, the executive may not act on its own to detain and
prosecute those who deal and use the drug. The legislature
must first enact a statute that outlaws the drug. The executive
also depends on the legislature for financial appropriations and
other forms of support. The executive also faces constraints
from the courts. If the executive arrests drug dealers and seeks
to imprison them, it must first obtain the approval of courts.
The courts ensure that the executive does not go beyond the
bounds of the new law, does not violate earlier-enacted laws
7. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
5-7, 10-12 (2010).
8. See POSNER & VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE, supra note 1.
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that have not been superseded by the new law, and does not
violate the Constitution.
In emergencies, the executive often will contemplate actions
that do not have clear legislative authority and might be consti-
tutionally dubious. For example, after September 11, the U.S.
government engaged in immigration sweeps, detained people
without charges, used coercive interrogation, and engaged in
warrantless wiretapping of American citizens.9 Many, if not all,
of these actions would have been considered violations of the
law and the U.S. Constitution if they had been undertaken
against normal criminal suspects the day before the attacks.
After September 11, both the legislature and the courts gave the
executive some deference. The legislature gave explicit authori-
ties to the executive that it had initially lacked;"o the courts did
not block actions that they would have blocked during normal
times." But neither body was entirely passive. Congress ob-
jected to coercive interrogation and did not give the executive
all the authorities that it requested. 12 After a slow start, the
courts also resisted some of the assertions the executive made.
There is some dispute about whether this resistance was mean-
ingful and caused the executive to change policy or merely re-
acted to the same stimuli that caused the executive to moderate
certain policies independently.13 In any event, no one disputes
that the courts gave the executive a nearly free pass over at
least the first five to seven years of the conflict with al Qaeda.
The deference thesis, then, can be strong-form or weak-form.
This ambiguity has had unfortunate consequences for debates
about post-September 11 legal policies. Few people believe that
the courts should impose exactly the same restrictions on the
9. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510-11 (2004) (describing detention
of U.S. citizen without the filing of charges); Rebecca Cathcart, Immigration Officials
Arrest 905 in California Sweep, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2008, at A15; David S. Cloud, Con-
cerns Led to Revisions, Rumsfeld Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2006, at A16 (describing
United States use of coercive interrogation techniques); Carol J. Williams, Wiretap-
ping Lawsuit May Have Its Day in Court, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2009, at A9.
10. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 6, at 208 (noting eventual congressional
authorization of military commissions, interrogations, and warrantless elec-
tronic surveillance).
11. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507 (permitting detention of an American citizen
without a full criminal trial).
12. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 6, at 208-09.
13. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, What Good is Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385,
401-05 (2010).
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executive during an emergency as during normal times. Indeed,
doctrine itself instructs courts to balance the security value of a
course of action and its cost to civil liberties, implying that cer-
tain actions might be legally justified to counter high-stakes
threats but not to counter low-stakes threats.14 Nor does anyone
believe that the executive should be completely unconstrained.
The debate is best understood in the context of the U.S. gov-
ernment's post-September 11 policies. Defenders of these poli-
cies frequently invoked the deference thesis-not so much as a
way of justifying any particular policy, but as a way of insisting
that the executive should be given the benefit of the doubt, at
least in the short term. The deference thesis rests on basic in-
tuitions about institutional competence: that the executive can
act more decisively and with greater secrecy than Congress or
the courts because it is a hierarchical body and commands
forces that are trained and experienced in countering security
threats. The other branches lack expertise. Although they may
have good ideas from time to time, and are free to volunteer
them, the ability of the executive to respond to security threats
would be unacceptably hampered if Congress and the courts
had the power to block it to any significant degree.
Secrecy is an important part of the argument. Policymaking
depends on information, and information during emergencies
often must be kept secret. Congress and the courts are by nature
and tradition open bodies; if they were to act in secret, their
value would be diminished. Meanwhile, the argument contin-
ues, the fear of an out-of-control executive who would engage in
abuses unless it was constrained by the other branches is exag-
gerated. The President has strong electoral and other political
incentives to act in the public interest (at least, in the United
States). Even if the executive can conceal various "inputs" into
counterterrorism policy, it cannot conceal the "output" -the ex-
istence, or not, of terrorist attacks that kill civilians.
Thus, it was possible for defenders of the Bush Administra-
tion's counterterrorism policies to express discomfort with cer-
tain policy choices, while arguing nonetheless that Congress
and the courts should not try to block executive policymaking
14. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531-34.
15. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization
and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005); John Yoo, Unitary, Execu-
tive, or Both?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1935 (2009) (book review).
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for the duration of the emergency-at least not as a matter of
presumption. Critics of the Bush Administration argued that
deference was not warranted-or at least not more than a lim-
ited amount of deference was warranted, although again these
subtleties often were lost in the debate-for a variety of rea-
sons. I now turn to these arguments.
II. EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS: THE
PROTOCOL ANALOGY
A. Medical Protocols
In an article published a few years ago, Professor Holmes uses
the arresting image of the medical protocol as a device for criti-
cizing the deference thesis-or, more broadly, the thesis that the
executive should be "unconstrained" during emergencies.
Holmes describes his own experience in an emergency room,
where his daughter had been brought with a serious injury:
At a crucial moment, two nurses rushed into her hospital
room to prepare for a transfusion. One clutched a plastic
pouch of blood and the other held aloft my daughter's medi-
cal chart. The first recited the words on the bag, "Type A
blood," and the other read aloud from the file, "Alexa
Holmes, Type A blood." They then proceeded, following a
prepared and carefully rehearsed script to switch props and
roles, the first nurse reading from the dossier, "Alexa
Holmes, Type A blood," and the second reading from the
bag, "Type A blood." 6
To the layman, the repetitive actions of the nurses seem
senseless. Why are they repeating themselves when the patient
might die unless she receives the blood transfusion immedi-
ately? Surely, the nurses should depart from the script rather
than follow it in a time of extreme medical urgency. Yet the
protocol makes good sense. Experience has taught medical per-
sonnel that basic errors -the transfusion of the wrong blood-
occur frequently, and that they can be avoided through the use
of simple protocols. Although following the protocol uses valu-
able time, in practice the increased risk to the patient as a result
16. Holmes, supra note 2, at 301-02.
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of the loss of time is less than the risk caused by the errors that
protocols are designed to prevent. 7
The larger and more striking point of the example is that,
even during emergencies, when the stakes are high and time is
of the essence, agents should follow rules rather than impro-
vise. In this way, agents should be constrained." This argu-
ment has potentially radical implications. Recall that the con-
ventional objection to deference is that the risk of executive
abuse exceeds the benefits of giving the executive a free hand
to counter al Qaeda. Professor Holmes argues-although at
times he hedges-that in fact the benefits of giving the Presi-
dent a free hand are zero: A constrained executive, like a con-
strained medical technician, is more effective than an uncon-
strained executive. If the benefits of lack of constraint are zero,
then the deference thesis is clearly wrong. Constraints both
prevent executive abuses such as violations of civil liberties
and ensure that counterterrorism policy is most effective.
B. Rules and Standards
The arresting medical protocol example helps clarify the
tradeoffs involved, but it remains merely an illustration of the
familiar rules versus standards tradeoff that has been a staple
of the legal literature since time immemorial. 9 A rule is a norm
that directs the decisionmaker to ignore some relevant policy
considerations when deciding on a course of action; a standard
is a norm that directs the decisionmaker to take into account all
relevant policy considerations when deciding on a course of
action. The familiar example is the speed limit. A sixty-mile-
per-hour speed limit tells the driver that she does not face a
legal sanction if she drives below sixty miles per hour, and that
she does face a legal sanction if she exceeds that speed. A stan-
dard-for example, "drive carefully" -tells the driver that she
does not face a legal sanction if she drives carefully, but that
she does if she drives carelessly. The standard, unlike the rule,
directs the driver to take into account all relevant considera-
tions-the weather, traffic congestion, her own skill and ex-
17. See id. at 302.
18. See id. at 302-03.
19. See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 155-58 (tent. ed. 1958). The
speed limit example below is drawn from this text. Id.
218 [Vol. 35
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perience, the responsiveness of her car, and so on-when de-
ciding how to drive.
A skilled and experienced driver who drives at sixty-five
miles per hour on a clear day on an empty, straight road poses
little threat to anyone, and most people would regard her driv-
ing as careful. Thus, under the standard she could not be held
liable, although under a rule she would be. Meanwhile, an in-
experienced driver who drives sixty miles per hour on a con-
gested, dangerous road, at night, in bad weather, would
probably be regarded as careless. He would be held liable un-
der a standard but not under the rule. It is in the nature of
standards that we cannot be sure that he would be held liable;
it depends on the biases, intuitions, and experiences of the legal
decisionmaker. 20 Thus, we say that applying standards in-
volves high decision costs. It is in the nature of rules that we
can easily tell whether the driver would be held liable or not,
but only because the legal decisionmaker is forced to ignore
relevant moral and policy considerations that otherwise com-
plicate evaluation. Rules are under- and over-inclusive; by de-
sign, they cause error.
These considerations lead to a basic prescription.21 Rules
should be used to govern recurrent behavior, and standards to
govern unusual behavior. Experience teaches us that if drivers
obey certain rules (such as speed limits), the risk of accidents is
greatly reduced, although judicious choice of (sometimes com-
plex) rules ensures that error costs are low. When legislatures
enact new rules, they can invest a great deal of time and effort
determining the optimal rules, because the cost of the rules are
then spread out over many instances of the behavior that the
legislatures seek to regulate. Yet rules frustrate us because
there always seems to be some new, unanticipated case where
the application of rules leads to an injustice. The speed limit
rule should not apply to the parent who rushes a badly injured
child to the hospital. And there are many cases where rules can
too easily be gamed. Tax rules, no matter how intricate, can be
exploited: Lawyers set up tax shelters that evade the purpose
of the rules. Congress reacted to this problem initially by creat-
ing ever more complex rules, but eventually trumped them
20. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557, 588 (1993).
21. Id. at 621-23.
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with a standard that prohibited bad faith evasion of the tax
laws.22
The legal landscape is a complex mix of rules and standards,
which often overlap. Drivers must obey both traffic rules like
the speed limit and traffic standards like laws against reckless
driving and tort norms against negligent driving. Indeed, one
can think of traffic norms as complex rules with standards-
where there are apparently bright-line rules (drive under sixty
miles per hour) that are subject to muddy standards (unless
there is an emergency).
Medical protocols are just one more example of a choice
along the rules-standards continuum. The nurses Professor
Holmes describes follow a protocol that ensures that they do
not use the wrong blood in a transfusion. Likewise, doctors are
instructed to clear the windpipe before staunching the
wound. 23 These protocols, like the speed limit, reflect generali-
zations from past medical experience. Delaying the blood
transfusion is less risky than permitting only one nurse to
check the blood type. Letting the blood flow from the wound is
less risky than leaving the windpipe blocked. In the absence of
protocols, medical practitioners may misjudge the situation, or
panic, or allow themselves to be distracted by irrelevant factors
(the goriness of the wound calls out for attention while the
blocked windpipe is hidden). It is important to see that these
rules, like the speed limit, are mere generalizations, and in in-
dividual cases the generalizations might be wrong. The patient
dies because of the delay before the transfusion, yet we instruct
medical practitioners to follow the rules because otherwise
they are likely to make worse or more frequent errors.
That uncompromising rules produce high error costs sup-
ports adopting sensible exceptions to rules. Indeed, medical
practitioners may violate protocols. The reasons are obvious.
Consider Professor Holmes's insistence that the rule "always
wash your hands" is unalterable and written in stone.24 This
clearly cannot be the case. Suppose that, in the midst of an
emergency involving a patient with a serious trauma, the staff
22. See Steven A. Dean & Lawrence M. Solan, Tax Shelters and the Code: Navigat-
ing Between Text and Intent, 26 VA. TAX REV. 879 (2007); see also Ellen Aprill, Tax
Shelters, Tax Law, and Morality: Codifying Judicial Decisions, 54 SMU L. REV. 9 (2001).
23. Holmes, supra note 2, at 305.
24. See id. at 309.
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is informed that the tap water is tainted, it is discovered that a
patient has a rare allergy to the only soap available in the
emergency room; or, for that matter, the emergency room runs
out of soap. Common sense (which is just the application of the
standard, "help the patient at minimal risk to him and oneself")
will tell the doctors and nurses to deviate from the protocols
when they clearly interfere with medical necessity. If they did
not, they would be sued, and rightly so. The protocols, like
many rules, turn out to be presumptions, which may be over-
come by the press of events. That is why medical professionals
are so highly trained; if one could really treat patients by fol-
lowing algorithms, one would not need doctors who have vast
training and experience that supplies them with judgment and
the ability to improvise.25
In sum, medical protocols, like rules, provide a valuable ser-
vice by simplifying the decision-making process at times of
high stress, but, like rules, they unavoidably produce wrong
results if they are not applied sensitively. Usually, when the
stakes are high, rules and protocols create presumptions, but
the decisionmaker is free to violate the presumption if circum-
stances suggest that that the presumption is based on factual
assumptions that turn out not to be true in the particular set-
ting in which the decisionmaker finds himself.
C. Rules and Standards During Emergencies
I now turn to the bulk of Professor Holmes's argument. Pro-
fessor Holmes is right to identify confusion about the nature of
emergency, and it is useful to distinguish a rule-development
stage -which often but not always takes place before the emer-
gency - and a rule-application stage - which takes place during
the emergency. Holmes argues that during the emergency, rule
application should be controlled by protocol, so the executive
does not need (much) discretion; while pre-emergency, rule
development does not need to be rushed and secret, so the ex-
ecutive can collaborate with Congress. The first problem with
25. This problem is famous from labor relations. Workers who seek to pressure
employers without going on strike (which in certain cases may be illegal) have
frequently adopted the strategy of "work-to-rule," where they follow the rules or
protocols of their job in a literal-minded way rather than use them as presump-
tions. The result is that they become extremely unproductive while maintaining
deniability, though no one is fooled. See generally Karl 0. Moene, Unions' Threats
and Wage Determinations, 98 ECON. J. 471 (1988).
No. 1] 221
HeinOnline  -- 35 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 221 2012
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
this argument is that during the emergency one can follow pro-
tocols rather than exercise discretion only if the emergency is
the same as earlier emergencies. This was not the case for Sep-
tember 11, though it may be the case for other security threats.
The second problem is that the rule-development stage cannot
always take place during normal times. For example, Septem-
ber 11 required not only an immediate response to the newly
discovered threat but also the development of new rules under
the shadow of that threat. Those rules needed to be developed
quickly and (for the most part) secretly, and these exigencies
limited the ability of Congress to contribute. A final point is
that Holmes ignores an important dimension of the problem:
the difference between agents, who in theory can merely follow
rules and protocols, and principals, who cannot. The Bush
Administration did in fact recognize the value of protocols and
used them frequently; it just did not apply them to itself.
1. Two Concepts of Emergency
Professor Holmes makes a valuable point, often neglected in
the literature, that there are two distinct phases for addressing
emergencies 26-what I will call the stage of rule development
and the stage of rule application. As we will see, the two stages
can run together, but conceptually they are distinct. The rule-
application stage comes when the patient is on the gurney. The
doctors follow the protocols in the course of helping the pa-
tient. The rule development stage occurs earlier. Someone must
decide what the protocols should be. Someone had to invent
the rule that two nurses must check the blood type and that
doctors should unblock the windpipe before staunching
wounds -just as the legislature must determine the speed limit
before drivers comply with it and police enforce it.
We might use the word "emergency" to refer to the time of rule
application. As Professor Holmes points out, however, for the
medical professionals, what seems like an emergency to a layper-
son is not an emergency at all.27 They just apply the protocols that
have been drilled into them, no different from assembly-line
workers. Under this definition of "emergency," it is hard to sup-
port the deference thesis and those who argue that the executive
26. Holmes, supra note 2, at 309-10.
27. See id. at 309.
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must be unconstrained during emergencies. If doctors are con-
strained during emergencies, why not executives?
If we refer instead to the time of rule-development, reliance
on the idea of emergency seems even less appropriate. The doc-
tors who develop emergency room protocols do not do so un-
der time pressure but at their leisure. They also can do so in a
large body, so as to take advantage of the perspectives of many
different people, and in public, so that all stakeholders have a
say. The executive can as well, the argument goes. When the
executive determines the rules that will govern the response
during a terrorist attack, it does so in advance, and it can, in-
deed should, do so in consultation with Congress and subject
to judicial constraint.
Thus, executive deference is unnecessary. During rule devel-
opment, there is no emergency, and so the executive, Congress,
and the courts can collaborate in developing appropriate rules
that will govern during emergencies. They can do so openly,
deliberately, and slowly, with full respect for constitutional
norms. During rule application, there is an emergency, but the
executive can merely follow the rules or protocols that were
developed during the rule-development stage. Thus, in the
rule-application phase, executive discretion is unnecessary. It
follows that deference to the executive is also unnecessary.
During rule development, Congress has no reason to defer to
the executive. During rule application, courts also have no rea-
son to defer to the executive, but should instead insist that the
executive comply with the rules.
2. Rule Application
Let us consider the stages in reverse order. We already have
addressed some of the problems with Professor Holmes's ar-
gument from protocols. Rules are seldom as bright-line as they
first appear. They often turn out to be presumptions which are
themselves subject to standards (drive under the speed limit
unless there is an emergency). It is true that security threats,
like medical emergencies, often fall into patterns and can be
addressed in partially rule-governed fashion. Thus, when a
gunman takes a hostage, the police follow certain rules: first
clearing the area, then making contact with the gunman, and so
on. Some officers will be given very simple rule-governed tasks
("don't let anyone cross this line"). But the rules quickly give
out. Every hostage-taker is different, and the most highly
No. 1] 223
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trained police officers will be given a great deal of discretion to
deal with him and to make the crucial decision to use force. But
even these types of threats are simple compared with the sce-
nario that opened up on September 11. The government knew
virtually nothing about the nature of the threat. It did not know
how many more members of al Qaeda were in the United
States, what their plans were, what resources were at their dis-
posal, what their motives were, or how much support they had
among American Muslims. 28 Protocols were worthless because
nothing like the attack had ever happened before. (The closest
analogy seemed to be the absurdly irrelevant example of Pearl
Harbor.) The government could not follow rules; it had to im-
provise subject to a vague standard-protect the public while
maintaining civil liberties to the extent possible. Improvise it
did-instituting detentions, sweeps, profiling, surveillance,
and many other policies on an unprecedented (in peacetime, if
that was what it was) scale. 29
For the rule-application stage, the deference thesis counsels
Congress and the judiciary to (presumptively) defer. Congress
simply cannot set about holding hearings, debating policy, and
voting on laws in the midst of emergency. Either the problem
will not be addressed, or Congress will end up voting on a bill
that it has not written, debated, or even read.3o For courts, too,
the alternatives are unrealistic. If courts enforce rules developed
for normal times, then they will interfere with the proper re-
sponse to the terrorist threat, just as they would if they required
the U.S. military to comply with the Fourth Amendment on the
battlefield. Alternatively, the courts could insist on applying a
standard and halt executive actions that, in the courts' view, vio-
lated the standard described above-protect the nation while
maintaining civil liberties to the extent possible. But here the
courts are at a significant disadvantage. They do not have in-
28. President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (Sept. 11, 2001) (transcript
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
20010911-16.htnl).
29. But if al Qaeda launched another attack on U.S. soil tomorrow, the argument
for deference would be weaker, because more is known about al Qaeda today
than ten years ago.
30. As occurred with the TARP law. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Cri-
sis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76
U. CHI. L. REv. 1613, 1625 (2009).
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formation about the nature of the threat.31 Courts can demand
this information from the government, but the government will
not give it to them because the government fears leaks (to say
nothing of recalcitrance caused by rivalries among intelligence
agencies). Moreover, judges are inexperienced in national secu-
rity unlike the specialists in the executive branch.
None of this is to deny Professor Holmes's basic point that pro-
tocols can be valuable. Indeed, the Bush administration was as
protocol-happy as any other institution. Consider the protocols
for interrogation which were disclosed in a leaked OLC memo:
In this procedure, the individual is bound securely to an in-
clined bench, which is approximately four feet by seven feet.
The individual's feet are generally elevated. A cloth is
placed over the forehead and eyes. Water is then applied to
the cloth in a controlled manner. As this is done, the cloth is
lowered until it covers both the nose and mouth. Once the
cloth is saturated and completely covers the mouth and
nose, air flow is slightly restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to
the presence of the cloth.... During those 20 to 40 seconds,
water is continuously applied from a height of twelve to
twenty-four inches. After this period, the cloth is lifted, and
the individual is allowed to breathe unimpeded for three or
four full breaths. The sensation of drowning is immediately
relieved by the removal of the cloth. The procedure may
then be repeated.32
So not even the Bush administration disagreed with Profes-
sor Holmes's argument that lower-level officials faced with re-
current situations should be subject to protocols where they are
appropriate. In this sense, Professor Holmes's argument misses
the mark entirely. The problem was not so much that protocols
were not used; the problem, if it was a problem, was that they
were developed, modified, and revised solely by the executive
branch. This leads to the question of rule development.
31. See Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361,
1405-08 (2009).
32. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., OLC, to John
Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel, CIA, Re: Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative, 3-4
(Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Interrogation Memorandum], available at
http://s3.amazonaws.com/nytdocs/docs/151/151.pdf.
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3. Rule Development
Recall that Professor Holmes says that the argument that the
executive can act more swiftly than Congress and the courts
does not apply to the rule-development stage because the crisis
is past even if the threat remains.33 But if we think back to Sep-
tember 11, the crisis did not end on that day, even if the imme-
diate threat of violence did. It was reasonable to believe that
other plots had been put into action and that violence could
erupt at any moment. As the weeks and months passed, these
concerns faded. But it also became clear that al Qaeda had
sympathizers in the United States, and that these people might
strike at any time, possibly on their own initiative, or volunteer
for training that would later make them considerably more
dangerous. The anthrax scare brought home the possibility that
al Qaeda could use even more deadly weapons than hijacked
airplanes. Every day brought another revelation of a hole in
border security. Thus, it was a matter of urgency to develop
new rules that would address the threat.
The government maintained the confidentiality of a constant
supply of intelligence, for fear of exposing sources and meth-
ods. 34 Meanwhile, the government was already taking secret
actions (many of which were later exposed), including tapping
cell phone calls, tracking monetary transfers, and infiltrating
terrorist organizations?" Optimal policy going forward neces-
sarily depended on secrecy. Policy X, which might seem plau-
sible given publicly available information, might turn out to be
unnecessary, redundant, or even counterproductive in light of
secret information about the activities of al Qaeda or secret Pol-
icy Y. Thus, although Congress could no doubt give useful ad-
vice, it seems hard to believe that it could have contributed
much to the development of counterterrorism tactics, any more
than it can contribute to military tactics (where to invade,
where to bomb) during a regular war.
A set of constitutional protocols normally applies to the mak-
ing of policy and its embodiment in government action. The ex-
33. See Holmes, supra note 2, at 310.
34. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 6, at 81 (noting that officials were limited in their
ability to reveal legal positions to avoid disclosing counterterrorism measures).
35. See Jon D. Michaels, All the President's Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partner-
ships in the War on Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901, 904 (2008) (discussing wiretapping
and money-transfer tracking programs).
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ecutive must act with Congress, and it must respect the courts; it
cannot act by itself. But these rules apply to normal times, and
the medical protocol analogy is of little use here. Medical proto-
cols do not need to be secret because patients have no incentive
to game them-unlike terrorists who benefit greatly from know-
ing the methods that the United States uses to spy on them, cap-
ture them, and interrogate them. Furthermore, medical protocols
are not based on secret information; they are based on widely
available medical research. Thus, when medical researchers de-
velop medical protocols at the rule development stage, they can
do so publicly without undermining the purpose of developing
the protocols in the first place.
By contrast, rules governing counterterrorism operations must
be developed mostly in secret, and mostly on the basis of secret
information. Hence the importance of keeping rule development
as much as possible within the only branch that possesses the
power to act against security threats. Those rules, of course,
would constrain only lower-level executive agents, not the ex-
ecutive itself. There is an obvious reason for this; if the rules are
wrong, they need to be corrected. It would similarly make little
sense for doctors to develop emergency room protocols that
could never be changed in the future as new technologies and
new health problems rendered the old protocols worthless.
Professor Holmes argues that the executive becomes subject
to groupthink and other decision-making pathologies when it
makes policy itself rather than with Congress and other
agents.36 But the same point can be made about executive deci-
sionmaking during regular wars, when the risk of groupthink
(if it is a risk) is tolerated because of the need for secrecy.
If Congress and the judiciary cannot constrain the executive
during emergencies because of the problem of secrecy, then
perhaps this problem can be overcome by putting the source of
constraint in the executive branch itself, where norms of se-
crecy prevail. That brings us to the Office of Legal Counsel.
III. INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS: THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL
In the early years of the Bush Administration, the Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC), an office within the Department of Jus-
36. Holmes, supra note 2, at 344-47.
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tice, issued a series of memoranda arguing that certain counter-
terrorism practices -including surveillance of U.S. citizens and
coercive interrogation- did not violate the law.37 These memos
were later leaked to the public, causing an outcry.38 In 2011, the
head of the OLC told President Obama that continued U.S.
military presence in Libya would violate the War Powers Act.
The President disregarded this advice, relying in part on con-
trary advice offered by other officials in the government.
These two events neatly encapsulate the dilemma for the
OLC, and indeed all the President's legal advisers. If the OLC
tries to block the President from acting in the way he sees fit,
it takes the risk that he will disregard its advice and marginal-
ize the institution. If the OLC gives the President the advice
that he wants to hear, it takes the risk that it will mislead him
and fail to prepare him for adverse reactions from the courts,
Congress, and the public.
Many scholars, most notably Professor Jack Goldsmith, argue
that the OLC can constrain the executive. 39 The underlying idea
here is that even if Congress and the courts cannot constrain the
executive, perhaps offices within the executive can. The opposite
view, advanced by Professor Bruce Ackerman, is that the OLC is
a rubber stamp.40 I advocate a third view: The OLC does not con-
37. E.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., OLC, to Alberto
R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation
under 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002); Memorandum from John C. Yoo,
Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., OLC, to David S. Kris, Associate Deputy Att'y Gen.,
Re: Constitutionality of Amending Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to
Change the "Purpose" Standard for Searches 1, 3 (Sept. 25, 2001).
38. GOLDSMITH, supra note 6, at 157-59 (discussing leak of memoranda related
to interrogations); id. at 177-81 (discussing leaks regarding surveillance program).
39. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 6, at 33. In a review of Ackerman, supra note 7,
Professor Trevor Morrison defends OLC against Ackerman's assertion that it can
only be a rubber stamp, but it is not clear whether Professor Morrison takes Pro-
fessor Goldsmith's view (that the OLC can serve as an external check on the ex-
ecutive) or a view closer to the one advanced in this paper (that the OLC serves as
an enabler). See Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV.
1688 (2011) [hereinafter Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism] (reviewing ACKERMAN,
supra note 7); Trevor W. Morrison, Libya, "Hostilities," the Office of Legal Counsel,
and the Process of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 62, 64-
65 (2011) [hereinafter Morrison, Libya] (again disputing Professor Ackerman's
assertion that the OLC's analysis is unreliable but without taking a stance on the
impact of that analysis on the scope of executive power).
40. See ACKERMAN, supra note 7 at 104. For similar skepticism, see Neal Kumar
Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch from
Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2335-38 (2006).
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strain the executive but enables him to accomplish goals that he
would not otherwise be able to accomplish. It is more accurate to
say that the OLC enables rather than constrains.
A. Background on the OLC
The OLC is a small office in the Justice Department headed
by an assistant U.S. Attorney General. 41 The OLC chief is nomi-
nated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and is
formally a subordinate of the Attorney General. The OLC is
essentially an adviser to an adviser. The Attorney General's
primary obligation is to give advice to the President; he typi-
cally relies on the OLC to produce that advice. But he retains
the authority to disagree and disregard it if he so chooses. In
practice, the OLC often gives advice directly to the President
because the Attorney General has delegated to it much of his
advice-giving role.4 2
Most matters that come before the OLC are routine. The OLC
provides legal analysis of bills, executive orders, and signing
statements. The OLC also plays an important role in resolving
disputes among executive agencies over legal authority. In
most of these cases, the President does not have any particular
agenda, so the OLC can give honest advice without fear of ret-
ribution.43 But in a number of significant cases, the White
House asks the OLC to evaluate a proposed action or policy
that the President clearly seeks to pursue. For example, the
President might seek to launch a military intervention, and ask
the OLC for legal authorization. In such cases, the White House
might put pressure on the OLC to rubber stamp the action.
B. The OLC as a Constraint on the Executive
A number of scholars have argued that the OLC can serve as
an important constraint on executive power.44 1 argue that the
OLC cannot act as such a constraint. Indeed, its only function is
the opposite -as an "enabler" or extender of executive power.
41. See Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 1448 (2010) [hereinafter Morrison, Stare Decisis] (and citations therein).
42. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 6, at 32.
43. See Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 437, 501 (1993).
44. See supra note 39.
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The President must choose a course of action. He goes to the
OLC for advice. Ideally, the OLC will provide him good advice
about the legality of the course of action. It will not provide
him political advice and other relevant types of advice. The
President wants to maximize his political advantage, 45 and so
he will follow the OLC's advice only if the legal costs that the
OLC identifies are greater than the political benefits. On this
theory, the OLC will always give the President neutral advice,
and the President will gratefully accept it although not neces-
sarily follow it.
If the story ended here, then it would be hard to see what the
controversy over OLC could be about. As an adviser, the OLC
possesses no ability to constrain the executive. If it does its job
properly, it merely supplies predictions about how other legal
actors will react to the President's proposed action. The execu-
tive can always choose to ignore the OLC's advice, so OLC
cannot serve as a constraint on executive power in any mean-
ingful sense. Instead, the OLC merely conveys information to
the President about the constraints on executive power that are
imposed from outside the executive branch.
There is an important twist that complicates the analysis. The
President can choose to publicize the OLC's opinions. Naturally,
the President will be tempted to publicize only favorable opin-
ions. When Congress 46 alleges that a policy is illegal, the Presi-
dent can respond that his lawyers advised him that the policy is
legal. This response at least partially deflects blame from the
President. There are two reasons for this. First, the Senate con-
sented to the appointment of the head of the OLC, so, if the OLC
gave bad advice, the Senate must share the blame. Second, OLC
lawyers likely care about their future prospects in the legal pro-
fession, which will turn in part on their ability to avoid scandals
and to render plausible legal advice, and they may also seek to
maintain the office's reputation. When the OLC's opinions are
not merely private advice but are used to justify actions, then the
OLC takes on a quasi-judicial function. Presidents are not
obliged to publicize the OLC's opinions, but clearly they see an
45. This assumption should be uncontroversial. If the President seeks to act law-
fully, then institutional constraints are hardly necessary.
46. Or other relevant audiences, including courts, the press, and the public; for
simplicity, I will generally refer to Congress.
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advantage to doing so, and in this way, they have given the OLC
quasi-judicial status. 47
If the President publicizes all OLC opinions, he takes the risk
that the OLC will publicly advise him that an action is illegal. If
OLC approval helps deflect blame from the President, then
OLC disapproval will tend to concentrate blame on a President
who ignores its advice. Congress and the public will note that
after all the President is ignoring the advice of lawyers that he
appointed and thus presumably trusts, and this can only make
the President look bad. To avoid such blame, the President may
refrain from engaging in a politically advantageous action. In
this way, the OLC might be able to prevent the President from
taking an action that he would otherwise prefer. At a mini-
mum, the OLC raises the political cost of the action.
I have simplified greatly, but this basic logic has led some
scholars to believe that the OLC constrains the President.48 But
this is a mistake. The OLC strengthens the President's hand in
some cases and weakens it in others, but overall it extends his
power and serves as enabler, not constraint.
To see why, consider an example in which the President
must choose an action that lies on a continuum, such as elec-
tronic surveillance. At one extreme, the President can engage in
actions that are clearly lawful-for example, spying on criminal
suspects after obtaining warrants from judges. At the other ex-
treme, the President can engage in actions that are clearly
unlawful-for example, spying on political opponents. OLC
opinions will not affect Congress's or the public's reaction to
either the obviously lawful or the obviously unlawful actions.
But then there are middle cases. Consider Policy L, which is
just barely legal, and Policy I, which is just barely illegal. The
President would like to pursue Policy L but fears that Congress
and others will mistakenly believe that Policy L is illegal. As a
result, political opposition to Policy L will be greater than it
would be otherwise.
In such a case, a favorable advisory opinion from a neutral
legal body that has credibility with Congress will help the
President.49 OLC approval of Policy L would cause political
47. Cf Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 39, at 1722-23.
48. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 6.
49. See Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 39, at 1722.
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opposition (to the extent that it is based on the mistaken belief
that Policy L is unlawful) to melt away. Thus, the OLC enables
the President to engage in Policy L, when without OLC partici-
pation that might be impossible. True, the OLC will not enable
the President to engage in Policy I, assuming OLC is neutral.
Indeed, OLC's negative reaction to Policy I might stiffen Con-
gress's resistance. Nevertheless, the President will use the OLC
only because he believes that on average, the OLC will
strengthen his hand.
An analogy to contract law might be illuminating. People en-
ter contracts because they enable them to do things ex ante by
imposing constraints on them ex post. For example, a debtor can
borrow money from a creditor only because a court will force
the debtor to repay the money ex post. It would be strange to say
that contract law imposes "constraints" on people because of ex
post enforcement. In fact, contract law enables people to do
things that they could not otherwise do -it extends their power.
If it did not, people would not enter contracts.
A question naturally arises about the OLC's incentives. I have
assumed that the OLC provides neutral advice, in the sense of
trying to make accurate predictions about how other agents like
Congress and the courts would react to proposed actions. It is
possible that the OLC could be biased-either in favor of the
President or against him. If the OLC were biased against the
President, he would stop asking it for advice (or would ask for
its advice privately and then ignore it).50 This danger surely ac-
counts for OLC jurisprudence being pro-executive." But it
would be just as dangerous for OLC to be excessively biased in
favor of the President because it would mislead him and lose its
credibility with Congress.52 As a result, the OLC could not help
the President engage in L policies. So the OLC must be neither
excessively pro-President nor anti-President. If it can avoid these
50. See Comellia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Execu-
tive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 716-17 (2005) ("[T]he more critically OLC exam-
ines executive conduct, the more cautious its clients are likely to be in some cases
about seeking its advice.").
51. See Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 41, at 1501.
52. See Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 39, at 1722 ("[I]f OLC says
yes too readily to its clients, it will no longer be useful to them," because its opin-
ions must "be taken seriously as a sober work of legal analysis by officials not
precommitted to the outcome" to mollify critics.").
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extremes, it will be an enabler; if it cannot, it will be ignored. In
no circumstance could it be a constraint.53
If the OLC cannot constrain the President, why have people
contended that the OLC can constrain the President? What is
the source of this mistake?
One possibility, which I already have noted, is that commenta-
tors might look only at one side of the problem. Scholars note that
the OLC may "prevent" the President from engaging in barely
illegal actions without also acknowledging that it can do so only if
at the same time it enables the President to engage in barely legal
actions. This is simply a failure to look at the full picture.
For example, President Bush arguably abandoned a scheme
of warrantless wiretapping without authorization from the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court because the OLC de-
clared the scheme illegal, and top Justice Department officials
threatened to resign unless President Bush heeded OLC ad-
vice.54 This seems like a clear example of constraint, but it is
important to look at the whole picture. If the OLC had ap-
proved the scheme, and later executive branch agents in the
53. There is a second twist to the analysis. The President and the OLC have de-
veloped a mechanism for limiting the downside of negative advice. That is the
process under which the OLC first gives the President legal advice orally and
privately, and then memorializes it in writing only if it is favorable (or otherwise
if the President consents). If this system worked perfectly, then the OLC would
enable the President to engage in all L policies without affecting his ability to en-
gage in I policies. As a result of OLC advice, Congress will drop its opposition to
Policy L; while in the absence of OLC advice, Congress's opposition to Policy I
will remain moderate because of its uncertainty about whether Policy I is illegal.
As a result of OLC's participation in executive branch decisionmaking, the politi-
cal opposition to Policy L drops to zero, while political opposition to Policy I re-
mains unchanged. See Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 41, at 1468-70.
It would be wrong to exaggerate the significance of this mechanism. If the OLC
never publicly gave the executive negative advice, then it would lose its credibil-
ity, and if the executive offers no OLC defense for certain actions when it has done
so in the past, Congress and others will naturally infer that the OLC has privately
given negative advice to the President. So for certain types of actions, Congress
will expect an OLC opinion and draw a negative inference if none is forthcoming.
See Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 39 at 1732-33; Morrison, Libya,
supra note 39, at 67-68. Still, the President's freedom to deny OLC's opinion to
Congress creates some noise in the system, as it is always possible that the OLC
failed to give advice rather than gave negative advice, and all this works to the
executive's advantage.
54. Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Department of Justice Politicizing the
Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. 218-20 (2007) [hereinafter Comey Testimony] (statement of James B.
Comey, former Deputy Attorney General).
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National Security Agency had been prosecuted and punished
by the courts, then the OLC's credibility as a supplier of legal
advice would have been destroyed. This outcome would have
been terrible for the President. As I have argued, a credible
OLC helps the President accomplish his agenda in barely legal
cases. Without taking into account those cases where OLC ad-
vice helps the President's agenda ex post as well as the cases
where OLC advice hurts the President's agenda ex post, one
cannot make an overall judgment about the OLC's ex ante ef-
fect on executive power.
Another possible source of error is that scholars imagine that
neutral advice will almost always prevent the President from
engaging in preferred actions, rather than enabling the Presi-
dent to engage in preferred actions. The implicit asssumption is
that a President will normally want to break the law, and that
under the proper interpretation of the Constitution and rele-
vant standards the President can accomplish very little. So if
OLC is in fact neutral and the President does obey its advice,
then it must constrain the President.
But this theory cannot be right, either. If the OLC constantly
told the President that he cannot do what he wants to do,
when, in fact, Congress and other agents would not object to
the preferred actions, then the President would stop asking
OLC for advice. As noted above, for the OLC to maintain its
relevance, it cannot offer an abstract interpretation of the Con-
stitution that is divorced from political realities; it has to be
able to make realistic predictions about how other legal agents
will react to the President's actions. This practical reality has
led the OLC to develop a pro-executive jurisprudence in line
with the long-term evolution of executive power.5 If the OLC
tried to impose constraints other than those imposed by Con-
gress and other institutions with political power, then the
President would ignore it.
55. See Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 41, at 1501-02 (noting the "generally
pro-executive tenor in OLC opinions").
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C. Evidence
1. Testing the Three Hypotheses
We have three hypotheses about the OLC on the table. The
first is that the OLC acts as an ex ante constraint on presidential
power, serving a role similar to that of Congress and the courts.
The second is that OLC is an ex ante enabler of presidential
power. The third hypothesis is Professor Ackerman's rubber-
stamp theory that the OLC serves neither as a constraint nor as
an enabler because it cannot say no ex post.56 This section will
briefly discuss the evidence for each hypothesis.
It is easy enough to distinguish Professor Ackerman's hy-
pothesis from the other two: if the OLC never or rarely says no,
then Professor Ackerman is right. In addition, Professor Ac-
kerman is right even if the OLC sometimes says no but the
President ignores the OLC in those cases.
Distinguishing the constraint and enabler hypotheses is more
difficult. Both hypotheses predict some ex post rejections of
presidential preferences. To distinguish the hypotheses, one
would need to look at the other side of the ledger: the cases
where the OLC has enabled the President to act where other-
wise Congress would have opposed him. Unfortunately, it
would be hard to identify such cases.
2. Statistical Evidence
In a study of written OLC opinions, Professor Trevor Morri-
son found that seventy-nine percent approved the President's
position, eight percent provided a mixed answer, and thirteen
percent disapproved the President's position17 In several cases,
OLC rejected the White House position on issues of signifi-
cance.-" In addition, Professor Morrison notes that because the
OLC usually provides negative advice orally, the written re-
cord reflects a selection bias in favor of approvals.59
But there is less here than meets the eye. First, one must keep
in mind that the executive is a "they," not an "it." When the
President cannot resolve policy differences among his major
56. See ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 68.
57. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 39, at 1717-18.
58. See id. at 1718 (providing examples).
59. Id. at 1719.
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advisers, he may well be indifferent about the OLC's reaction
and indeed welcome a legal resolution ("sorry, my hands are
tied"). Second, the relevant focus, for the purpose of my argu-
ment, is OLC advice on national security issues. On this topic,
there only appear to be four documented, unclassified cases in
the OLC's entire history in which it said "no" to the executive:
the rejection of the Bush Administration's argument that the
Geneva Conventions do not apply to terrorists in Iraq in 2002,60
the rejection of certain forms of coercive interrogation in 2003,61
the rejection of an electronic surveillance program that circum-
vented the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in 2003,62
and the rejection of the Libya intervention in 2011.63
Even these cases turn out to be ambiguous. The OLC first said
"yes" on coercive interrogation and electronic surveillance and
then changed its mind a few years later.64 In addition, the OLC's
"no" on coercive interrogation turned out to be less than abso-
lute. It continued to authorize waterboarding even after the ear-
lier memorandum was withdrawn.65 Unfortunately, evaluating
the empirical evidence is even harder than Professor Morrison
indicates. The problem is not just that negative advice is confi-
dential; the problem is that we do not know how the executive
responded to this negative advice. Did it desist from its conduct?
Modify it along the margins? Or ignore the OLC?
A further methodological problem concerns whether a "no"
blocks an important policy or simply requires certain i's to be
dotted or t's to be crossed. OLC officials often emphasize that
their job is to help the White House find a legally acceptable
60. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 6, at 39-42.
61. See id. at 141-61.
62. See id. at 180-82; see also Comey Testimony, supra note 54, at 218-20.
63. See, e.g., Morrison, Libya, supra note 39, at 65. Former OLC officials report
that OLC has on numerous occasions provided a classified no, which the Presi-
dent has complied with. See, e.g., Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 39,
at 1718. It is impossible to argue with someone who cites secret evidence. Without
doubting their sincerity, one can question whether they know the complete story,
or have thought about the evidence systematically and considered alternate hy-
potheses. In any event, dependent as I am on public sources, my argument will
proceed accordingly.
64. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 6 at 140-46 (discussing original OLC opinion on
coercive interrogation); Comey Testimony, supra note 54, at 214-15 (discussing "re-
evaluation" of electronic surveillance program).
65. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 39, at 1726 n.144.
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method of accomplishing their aims.6 6 Even the early Bush
Administration OLC drew the line on certain forms of torture,
such as mock executions, the use of insects to exploit fears, and
so on, and established guidelines to ensure the safety of detain-
ees.67 The problem with treating this advice as a "no" is that it
is not clear that the executive cared about these details, as op-
posed to the broad agenda of using coercive interrogation prac-
tices. The Administration no doubt wanted legal advice so as to
minimize the risk of legal liability.
Finally, President Obama ignored the OLC's position on the
Libya intervention. In that case, the OLC took a brave stand,
only to be pushed to the sidelines. This major event offered
unusually rapid confirmation of Professor Ackerman's asser-
tion that the executive can avoid negative advice from the OLC
by soliciting advice from the White House Counsel's Office.
(President Obama also received favorable advice from the State
Department legal counsel.) Professor Morrison argued before
this event that the President faces strong disincentives to doing
an end-run around the OLC.68 Afterward, he could only criti-
cize the President, allege that the President suffered from nega-
tive political fallout, and note that he hoped that this sort of
thing does not happen often.69 Although the President was
criticized, there is simply no evidence that his evasion of the
OLC has hurt him politically. As is so often case, the (apparent)
success of the operation provides its own justification.
These examples provide some evidence that OLC serves as
enough of an ex post constraint to undermine Professor Acker-
man's extreme thesis, but still is weak evidence of robust con-
straints. It is hard, on this evidence, to distinguish between the
constraint and enabler hypotheses. In other words, it is possible
that the OLC serves as either a weak constraint or a weak enabler.
Why has the OLC been so weak? First, the constellation of
factors that drive decisionmaking in the executive branch
might prevent the President from using the OLC to solve a
time-inconsistency problem. The President benefits from neu-
66. See id.
67. See, e.g., Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 32, at 14 (insisting that only
harmless insects can be used and that subjects be informed that the insects cannot
cause death or severe suffering).
68. See Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 39, at 1741.
69. Morrison, Libya, supra note 39, at 74.
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tral advice and from the ability to cite OLC approval. When the
OLC blocks the President, however, short-term political con-
siderations trump the medium-term advantages of maintaining
a neutral OLC. Meanwhile, OLC lawyers yield to political pres-
sure either for careerist reasons or to prevent the President
from cutting the OLC out of the process. Private lawyers face
similar pressures, but the market in legal services might pro-
vide some additional discipline. 70
Second, the problem might lie in the nature of foreign rela-
tions and national security. These areas of action have been no-
toriously difficult to bring under legal control. Courts have fre-
quently have been asked to adjudicate national security
disputes between Congress and the President. Generally speak-
ing, courts have resisted these requests, treating these issues as
political questions or nonjusticiable for other reasons.7 1 The
usual explanation for this resistance is that courts are not ex-
perts on these issues; that the highly fluid, frequently changing
nature of foreign relations and national security makes them
unsuitable for slow, rule-bound, public, and decentralized
resolution; and that, accordingly, courts fear that if they inter-
vene, the executive branch will ignore their rulings, provoking
a constitutional crisis. 72
The supposed solution to this problem is to ask an advisory
office in the executive branch to assume a function that the
courts have repudiated. A small executive branch office might
overcome certain problems that courts face relating to secrecy
and speed, but the fundamental problem is that foreign rela-
tions are not susceptible to regulation by rules.73
70. See generally Lund, supra note 43, at 447-59.
71. See, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the triggering of the War Powers Resolution involves a
nonjusticiable political question, and collecting cases).
72. To give a stark example, as the Supreme Court considered the case of German
saboteurs captured on American soil during World War II, President Roosevelt told
his Attorney General that he planned to execute them regardless of the Court's deci-
sion. "The Supreme Court got the message as well," and it approved the executions.
GOLDSMITH, supra note 6, at 52; see also POSNER & VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BAL-
ANCE, supra note 1, at 31 (discussing weaknesses of judicial decisionmaking).
73. See generally ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UN-
BOUND (2010).
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3. A Case Study: Military Intervention Without
Congressional Authorization
Given the inconclusive nature of the statistical evidence,
one might also consider the evidence in a qualitative fashion.
In this Section, I undertake such an analysis, focusing on
military intervention.
The executive has on a number of occasions sought to send
military forces into foreign countries without congressional
consent. A lively controversy exists over whether the President
has such authority. The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the
power to declare war. Yet founding era sources suggest that
opinion at that time was that the President could unilaterally
use force in certain circumstances -for example, to repel inva-
sions. Since the Founding, the executive has used force on for-
eign territory (rather than to repel invasions) on numerous oc-
casions without congressional authorization.74 Such actions
gave rise to the view within the executive branch that tradition
sanctioned the unilateral use of force even in foreign countries,
albeit subject to ill-defined limits.7 - After the Vietnam War,
which was widely blamed on the executive despite congres-
sional acquiescence, Congress passed the War Powers Resolu-
tion over the President's veto. This Act required the President
to withdraw troops from hostilities within sixty days unless he
received congressional authorization.76
Both before and after September 11, the OLC fought off these
twin constraints on executive power. In 1992, for example,
President George H.W. Bush ordered American troops into So-
malia where they engaged in combat with local militias. The
OLC resolved the constitutional question by arguing that the
executive has constitutional authority to send troops onto for-
eign soil to protect Americans and American property.77 In 1994,
President Clinton prepared to launch a military invasion of Haiti
after a coup overthrew the government, but the new govern-
ment of Haiti backed down, and American troops entered Hai-
tian territory to conduct peacekeeping operations. President
Clinton did not have congressional authorization for the transfer
74. See Louis FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR AND SPENDING
91 (2000).
75. Id.
76. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1544(b) (Supp. 2009).
77. Authority to Use U.S. Military Forces in Somalia., 16 Op. O.L.C. 6-7 (1992).
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of American troops onto potentially hostile soil. Instead, the
OLC argued that the deployment of troops accorded with an
appropriations bill that barred the use of appropriated funds for
military operations in Haiti unless justified by U.S. national se-
curity interests.7 The appropriations bill did not by its terms au-
thorize anything. The OLC further explained that the President
did not need congressional authorization under the Declaration
of War Clause in part because because "the deploy-
ment ... [took] place, with the full consent of the legitimate gov-
ernment of the country involved." 79 Such an event is not a "war"
even if it could quickly turn into war. In addition, the War Pow-
ers Resolution does not apply "where the risk of sustained mili-
tary conflict [is] negligible."8
In 1995, President Clinton decided U.S. forces should enter
Bosnia and Herzegovina to enforce a fragile peace agreement.
The OLC found itself unable to rely on an appropriations bill.
Instead of citing a statute, the OLC noted the President has
the "power to deploy troops abroad without the initiation of
hostilities," citing historical practice and the President's
Commander-in-Chief power, the much criticized constitu-
tional basis for many Bush-era OLC opinions.8' In this case,
the risk of sustained military conflict was not negligible.8 2 But
that risk no longer mattered. Because the parties had con-
sented to the deployment of troops, there is still no "war" and
neither the Declaration of War clause nor the War Powers
Resolution applied.
In 1999, President Clinton ordered a massive air bombard-
ment of Serbia. Congress again refused authorization; indeed,
the bill to authorize military operations was voted on but failed
to pass on a tie vote. It was impossible to argue that the risk of
sustained military conflict was negligible or that the Serbs con-
sented to the bombardment of their own country. The OLC
rested its case on an appropriations statute enacted after the
78. Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C. 173, 173-75 (1994).
79. Id. at 177-78.
80. Id. at 176.
81. Proposed Deployment of Troops into Bosnia, 19 Op. O.L.C. (1995),
http://www.justice.gov/olc/bosnia2.htm.
82. Id. ("Although, combat conceivably may occur during the course of the op-
eration, it is not likely that the United States will find itself involved in extensive
or sustained hostilities.").
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commencement of hostilities. 3 President Clinton sent Ameri-
can troops into action and then dared Congress to deny them
funding. Trapped, Congress reluctantly authorized funds. For
the OLC, the War Powers Resolution did not stand in the way
of the war because of the appropriations statute even though
the War Powers Resolution said that appropriations statutes do
not count as congressional authorization.
During the George W. Bush Administration, the OLC took
aggressive positions on a range of issues, including the use of
coercive interrogation (despite a statute that banned torture) and
warrantless surveillance (despite a statute that restricted surveil-
lance). 4 OLC opinions relied heavily on the constitutional au-
thority of the executive, using it to justify narrow interpretations
of the statutes.85 The OLC later withdrew these memos.86
In 2011, President Obama ordered U.S. forces to participate
in a NATO bombardment of Libya. Again, Congress refused to
authorize the action. The OLC advised the President that he
could intervene without congressional authorization, citing its
earlier opinions on military intervention.87 Two months later, in
response to questions about whether the intervention complied
with the War Powers Act's sixty-day limit, the White House
released a document to Congress with a one-page legal analy-
sis. Consistent with previous OLC doctrine, the President ar-
gued that "the President had constitutional authority, as
Commander in Chief and Chief Executive and pursuant to his
foreign affairs powers, to direct such limited military opera-
tions abroad."88 In addition, the President argued that the War
Powers Resolution did not require congressional authorization
because the action in Libya was not really a "war":
U.S. military operations are distinct from the kind of "hostili-
ties" contemplated by the Resolution's 60 day termination
provision. U.S. forces are playing a constrained and support-
ing role in a multinational coalition, whose operations are
both legitimated by and limited to the terms of a United Na-
83. Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kosovo, 24 Op. O.L.C. 1, 3-4 (2000).
84. See Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 32.
85. See O.L.C., Memorandum Opinion for the Deputy Attorney General, De-
cember 30, 2004, available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm.
86. Id.
87. See Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1 (April 1, 2011).
88. White House Admin., United States Activities in Libya 25 (2011), available at
http://info.publicintelligence.net/ObamaLibyaJustification.pdf.
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tions Security Council Resolution that authorizes the use of
force solely to protect civilians and civilian populated areas
under attack or threat of attack and to enforce a no-fly zone
and an arms embargo. U.S. operations do not involve sus-
tained fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces,
nor do they involve the presence of U.S. ground troops, U.S.
casualties or a serious threat thereof, or any significant chance
of escalation into a conflict characterized by those factors.89
The narrow definition of "hostilities" echoed the narrow defini-
tion of "torture" used by the Bush-era OLC. The reliance on UN
Security Council authorization echoed President Truman's reli-
ance on Security Council authorization for the U.S. military inter-
vention in Korea (also not authorized by Congress).90
Press reports later revealed that the OLC refused to issue an
opinion advising the President that the use of military force in
Libya was consistent with the War Powers Act, and that the
President instead relied on the advice of the State Department
legal adviser and the White House Counsel.9'
What are we to make of this history? One view is that it con-
firms the rubber-stamp hypothesis. The OLC has always rub-
ber stamped legal interventions up until 2011, and when it de-
clined to do so, the White House ignored it.
The rubber-stamp hypothesis raises some questions: why
would the OLC go to such elaborate lengths to provide narrow
justifications for military interventions in the early years, and why
would the OLC finally draw the line on Libya? It seems likely that
the OLC sought to prevent its credibility from eroding com-
pletely. An OLC that is truly a rubber stamp would be of no value
to the President and might as well be disposed of completely.
At the same time, the OLC could not in the end constrain the
executive from pursuing the military intervention in Libya. If the
OLC preserved its credibility by rendering a "no," it could not
provide the checking function of Congress and the judiciary. The
President's decision to disregard OLC advice is more in the
spirit of the enabler hypothesis than the constraint hypothesis;
89. Id.
90. See S.C. Res. 83, 7, U.N. SCOR, 5th Year, U.N. Doc. S/INF/4/Rev. 1 at 5
(June 27, 1950); S.C. Res. 82, 914-7, 8-10, U.N SCOR, 5th Year, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/4/Rev.1 at 4 (June 25, 1950).
91. See Charlie Savage, 2 Top Lawyers Lose Argument on War Power, N.Y. TIMES,
June 17, 2011, at Al.
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the President made what one hopes was a rational decision to
weaken his hand with Congress in future confrontations because
he believed that the stakes were too high in the Libya interven-
tion to withdraw the troops. The gamble might well have paid
off. The President's success in Libya in the face of congressional
opposition might have the long-term effect of eroding the War
Powers Act rather than weakening the executive; in that case,
President Obama acted wisely by overruling the OLC.
D. Alternatives
Despairing of both the traditional external checks on the ex-
ecutive (as intended by Madison) and internal checks on the ex-
ecutive (as advocated by Professor Goldsmith), Professor Ac-
kerman suggests the creation of an executive tribunal that would
have the power to review presidential assertions of power and
restrict such assertions when unlawful.9 2 Professor Neal Katyal
proposed vesting the OLC's quasi-judicial authority in an execu-
tive branch official who enjoys more independence than the
head of the OLC currently possesses.93 Neither approach, how-
ever, solves the underlying problem that has resulted in execu-
tive discretion. Because unanticipated national security emer-
gencies call for powers that cannot be stipulated in advance, the
executive's actions at such times are not susceptible to tradi-
tional rule-bound legal analysis. Therefore, either the external
official or tribunal will honestly apply the law and end up inter-
fering with policies needed to protect national security, or he (or
it) will enjoy de facto policymaking authority, which will not be
regarded as legitimate in a political appointee.
CONCLUSION
Professor Holmes's medical protocol analogy does not pro-
vide any reason for doubting the deference thesis. Rules are
valuable in many settings, including emergencies, but it does
not follow from that observation that courts and legislatures
rather than the executive should create and enforce the rules.
Each institution has specific advantages; the executive's advan-
tages are salient during emergencies.
92. ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 143-46.
93. Katyal, supra note 40, at 2337.
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The notion that the executive can be constrained by its own
components is a paradoxical idea and has little to recommend it.
In the end, someone must have discretion to respond to unfore-
seen events, and in the U.S. system that role has been given to the
President. The theory that the OLC or some similar office within
the executive branch could constrain the President rests on a con-
fusion between rational self-binding, which the President may,
albeit with difficulty, engage in, and external constraint, which the
President will resist. The OLC may serve as a device for rational
self-binding, which extends the executive power; it is highly
unlikely, however, that it can serve as a constraint.
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